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Abstract
Because of the lack of competition regulation, certain contract provisions attempt to substitute
for such vacuum. In an era when private ownership of infrastructure projects is gaining grounds,
the need for elaborated competition regulation is more pressing than ever. Private ownership does
not necessarily mean personal funding. The more common mode of funding involves a syndicate
of banks, which brings a third competing interest to this type of transactions, rendering the need
for competition law an essentiality to avoid confusion. The involved interests, while diversified,
are not always conflicting. For instance, the continuity of public service is a major concern of all
contracting parties, but for different reasons. This unity of goals justifies a unity of solutions in
form of uniform legal reforms.
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INTRODUCTION
Historically, infrastructure projects have been undertaken
by public utilities or services, run by the state or entities with a
special national mandate, and financed by taxpayers. In the wel-
fare state, the function of running a public utility-be it a sewer
system or a telephone communication service-was regarded as
one of the services traditionally provided by the state. This is not
to say that the private sector was totally excluded from participat-
ing in operating public infrastructure services. In fact, the no-
tion of public utilities or services has evolved differently in differ-
ent countries. In some countries, the private sector participation
in such sectors was not totally prohibited but took the form of a
regulated license, franchise, or concession. Here, private sector
investment in infrastructure was allowed upon government au-
thorization and on the assumption that the service provided was
a public service requiring certain regulations.
This situation, which prevailed throughout most of the
twentieth century, was not always the case. We must not forget
that it was the private sector that, during the nineteenth century,
developed the world's railway, electricity, and telecommunica-
tions systems through investing substantial amounts of money in
then-granted concessions. As public services expanded, necessi-
tating large scale funding not available in the relatively limited
capital market, however, the governments undertook the task
with the help of public funds or international financial institu-
tions.
Deficits along with budgetary and financial constraints re-
cently experienced by most governments have forced both devel-
oped and developing countries to search for alternative means
to develop an ever-expanding need for infrastructure. With the
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start of the Margaret Thatcher era in the United Kingdom and
the victory of right wing or center-right parties in Europe in the
late 1970s and the 1980s, the situation took a 180' turn. Public
utilities were sold to the private sector, with the United Kingdom
playing a leading role in this endeavor. Deregulation was the
name of the game. I remember how, as a Ph.D. student in the
late 1980s and early 1990s, I must have been the only student not
writing about the deregulation of one of the sectors. Privatiza-
tion and deregulation meant more developed competition law,
which was a goal undertaken by the European Community fol-
lowing the lead of the United States.
Parallel to this change, the capital markets were strength-
ened and commercial lending became available for larger scale
projects. No longer were the financial markets limited. There
were funds available to finance five hundred or even eight hun-
dred million dollar projects. Coupled with the budgetary and
financial constraints faced by governments, it made very little
sense to finance infrastructure projects through public funding,
thus putting the ultimate burden on taxpayers. Accordingly,
while sectors were deregulated and existing projects privatized,
using private financing to modernize, expand, or develop new
infrastructure projects became the norm rather than the excep-
tion.
These are usually long-term complex transactions requiring
special financing techniques, globally known as project finance,
that involve a multiplicity of parties and different project forms.
They may take the form of Build-Operate-Transfer ("BOT"),
Build-Own-Operate ("BOO"), Build-Own-Operate-Transfer
("BOOT"), Build-Own-Lease-Transfer ("BOLT"), or Build-Rent-
Transfer ("BRT"), to name only a few. These transactions are
constantly evolving and every project's documents accommodate
the specific needs of the concerned project and country involved
and, accordingly-although they have common features-the
forms of transactions vary considerably. For these reasons, I pre-
fer to use the term "privately financed infrastructure transac-
tions" or "project finance" to refer to all forms of developing
infrastructure projects, be it a BOOT or any other form.'
1. See generally, Privately-Financed Infrastructure Projects: Draft Chapters of a Legislative
Guide on Privately-financed Infrastructure Projects Report of the Secretary General, U.N. GAOR,
Int'l Trade L. Comm., 30th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/CN. 9/438 (1996). Stephen W. Stein,
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Under this transaction form, there are two competing inter-
ests, that of the private financier 2 and that of the public utility.
Concerns of each participant are reflected in the project docu-
mentation in certain ways. This fact is particularly true with re-
spect to competition law issues, which necessitate separating the
discussion of each of these concepts. Before dwelling on eluci-
dating the contractual provisions geared towards protecting
each of the contracting parties and addressing their concerns, it
is important to define the set of contracts constituting a project
finance agreement.
I. PROJECT FINANCE
"Project finance" is a term used to reference a model of pri-
vate financing, where the repayment of financing funds is mainly
dependent on the financed project itself. It is the
financing of a particular economic unit in which the lender is
satisfied to look initially to the cash flows and earnings of that
economic unit as the source of funds from which a loan will
be repaid and to the assets of the economic unit as a collat-
eral for the loan.3
The finance is usually divided into two portions, debt capital and
equity, in the ratio of seventy to thirty percent or eighty to twenty
percent, or any range in between. The difference between debt
and equity ratios is usually significant in favor of debt since it is
the cheaper form of finance.
The sponsors or developers of the project participate in eq-
uity. These participants are usually a group of investors taking a
stake in the project company, which is normally a one-purpose
vehicle. It is common that one of the sponsors is a local partner,
which may, or may not, be a governmental entity. The debt is
raised from capital markets of commercial banks and other fi-
Build Operate-Transfer (BOT)-A Re-evaluation, 11 INT'L CONSTRUCTION L. REv. 101
(1994); Anthony Merna et al., Benefits of a Structured Concession Agreement for Build-Own-
Operate-Transfer ("BOOT") Projects, 10 INT'L CONSTRUCTION L. REv. 32 (1993); Fritz Nick-
lisch, The BOT Model, 9 INT'L CONSTRUCTION L. REV. 423 (1992).
2. John Scriven, Banking Perspective on Construction Risks in BOT Schemes, 11 INT'L
CONSTRUCTION L. REV. 313 (1994); Scott Hoffmann, A Practical Guide to Transactional
Project Finance: Basic Concepts, Risk Identification and Contractual Considerations, 45 Bus. L.
181 (1989).
3. PETER K. NEvITr & FRANK FABozzi, PROJECT FINANCE (6th ed., 1995); see RoNALD
F. SuLuvAN, FINANCING TRANSACTIONAL PROJECTS (1993).
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nancial institutions and export credit agencies. Due to the large
amount required to finance infrastructure projects, debt is usu-
ally obtained in the form of syndicated loans with participation
of more than one bank. Commercial banks prefer medium-term
tenures, while multilateral financial institutions and export agen-
cies are more willing to take long-term risk and, hence, their ten-
ures are longer.
Most of the more recent project finance are the projects put
up for bid. No longer is the route of direct negotiations taken.
A bid is more transparent; it guarantees the lowest pricing and
awards the project to the most competitive bidder. All in all, it is
regarded as the most efficient way of guarding the public inter-
est and ensuring a fair chance to all competing sponsors. Once
the bid is won, the successful consortium transfers its joint ven-
ture agreement, which is normally sufficient for purposes of the
bid, to a project company incorporated under the laws of the
country where the project is located. Based on the information
of the project company, several contracts are entered into.
The type and number of contracts concluded depends on
the users and the end product. Where the end product is capa-
ble of being directly consumed by its potential end consumer
without the need for any further process, the contract entered
into is a contract for sale of such end product. Electricity, water,
and liquified natural gas are good examples. Where the product
needs further processing to be ready for consumption, however,
the contract is often a concession. Oil exploration and produc-
tion, as well as lumber contracts, are the classical examples. In a
concession, the agreement is always concluded between a private
party, i.e., the project company, and the host government, its
agent, or another instrumentality of the host government. This
situation is not always true with respect to contracts of sale of
end products, which may be directly consumed. In the latter in-
stance, since the project is designated for commercial users, the
off-taker may be a private party, and, hence, the government
may or may not be a party to the deal. Accordingly, the two par-
ties to the sale-purchase contract may be private parties.
Bearing this fact in mind, the discussion to follow is perti-
nent mainly to agreements involving a government or a public
party and would rarely apply to purely private transactions. In
addition to sale or concession contracts, there must be a site use
contract-be it a lease or a usufruct of a building or land. De-
2000]
S64 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 23:$60
pending on the type of project, transportation, retail sale, fuel
supply, or a management contract may be concluded. In addi-
tion, there is an operation and maintenance (or "O&M") agree-
ment as well as an Engineering, Procurement, and Construction
("EPC") contract based on a fixed price and comprising a com-
pletion guarantee.
On the finance side, the project normally reflects several
agreements, including subscription, equity support, and finance
agreements. Under the latter category, all agreements are
aimed at providing the project company with the necessary li-
quidity to execute the project. These agreements may include
bank loans, underwriters, bonds, note-holders, export agencies,
or multilateral institutions. To guarantee the repayment of
these borrowed funds, several collateral are executed.4 The col-
lateral documents grant the project creditors security interest in
all its rights and assets. These may take the form of a mortgage,
pledge, and/or assignment of revenues. Regardless of the de-
tails of the finance deal, which is not our main concern, all lend-
ers, as a group, are particularly concerned with the project's eco-
nomic viability and the commercial deal incorporated in the
project documents. In project finance, as opposed to traditional
corporate/bank finance, there is a lack of, or limited recourse
to, personal/corporate guarantees, which makes lenders rely
heavily on the project's cash flow and assets. Since the physical
assets of infrastructure projects are not-in most cases-of in-
dependent significant value and their potential markets are lim-
ited, lenders to projects of this sort are exposed to very high risk.
Not only does the guarantee of a constant cash flow becomes a
crucial issue, but the continuous operation of the project also
becomes an essential contractual goal.
In this context, the relationship with competing projects-
either existing or potential ones-becomes of critical impor-
tance, especially with respect to the pricing of the goods or serv-
4. See PHILIP R. WOOD, COMPARATIVE LAW OF SECURITY AND GUARANTEES (1995);
Emily Altman & E. Walde Warner, Jr., Credit Agreements and Collateral Arrangements, PRAC-
TISING LAW INSTITUTE/COMM. & PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES (1995); Gary S.
Wigmore, Credit Documentation for Project Finance Transactions, PRACrISING LAW INSTI-
TUTE/COMM. L. & PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIeS (1992); Derek Asiedu Akroft,
Negative Pledge Clauses in International Loan Agreements, 26 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 407
(1995); Raymer McQuistan, Drafting an Enforceable Guaranty in an International Financing
Transaction: A Lender's Perspective, 10 INT'L TAx & Bus. L. 138 (1993).
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ices that constitute the main revenue source. In many develop-
ing or emerging markets, due to market limitations, more
projects mean less revenue, and, hence, less resources to satisfy
the lenders. Similarly, because of the lack of a regulatory frame-
work for competition, it is not uncommon that competing
projects engage in unfair practices, which ultimately may push
competitors out of the market.
The banks' two main objectives are a constant cash flow and
a continuous operation of the project. To realize these goals,
the lenders must use contractual documents to guard against
any potential threats. In other words, in the absence of market
regulations, private contracts attempt to provide a substitute,
which in most cases is more concerned with individual interests
and not those of a class, e.g., consumers or the market as a
whole.
This situation is further complicated by the public nature of
infrastructure projects. It must never be forgotten that these
projects, regardless of how they are financed, render a public
service. Supply of water, electricity, telecommunications, or
even transportation-these services are of public concern and
politically sensitive. Cutting off any such service or providing it
for an exaggerated charge is not a politically desirable situation
for any government, be it a developed or developing country.
These tensions and conflicts of interest reflect themselves in
the contractual documents of project finance. It is only natural
that each of the contracting parties looks to protect its own inter-
est. The project finance group of contracts usually reflects the
compromise position that reconciles conflicting interests. Still,
some of the provisions lend themselves more to the protection
of one of the contracting parties. The following sections review
some of the more relevant contract provisions from a competi-
tion law perspective.
II. SPONSORS/CREDITORS CLAUSES
The interests of sponsors developing the project and credi-
tors are not always identical. On the whole, however, both these
interests are opposite to those of the government. The following
discussion not only concentrates on clauses that reflect the com-
mon interests of both sponsors and creditors, but also highlights
points of divergence.
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A. Access Provisions
One of the main concerns of both sponsors and creditors of
a BOOT project is access to markets and market share necessary
to preserve the project's viability and payment capacity. Ensuing
from this reality, many of the BOOT contractual documents di-
rectly or indirectly attempt to ensure exclusivity/most favored
treatment clauses. Exclusivity is a concern in technology edge
projects or where potential markets are limited.
In either case, the real issue is that the BOOT project is cap-
ital intensive, the recapture of which needs a guaranteed mini-
mum return. Therefore, allowing new competitors to the mar-
ket would simply disrupt the calculated returns rendering the
project non-viable. One of the means of guaranteeing a mini-
mum return to such projects, without actually obtaining a gov-
ernment guarantee in one form or another, is an exclusivity
clause. Under such clauses, a project is granted exclusive access
to the market for a specific period of time. Many project agree-
ments would require that:
The licensor agrees that no (other) license will be issued for a
period of four years from the date of signing of this license,
unless for reasons only depending on licensees, the number
of (those) on waiting lists exceeds 10% of the (already ex-
isting consumers) for longer than two months. After this pe-
riod, the licensor might decide to issue a tender in view of
selecting a (new licensee) and the granting of the applicable
license. In this respect the licensor undertakes (i) to inform
beforehand the licensee of the possibility of the issuance of a
new license (ii) that the terms and conditions of new license
shall be substantially and materially similar from financial,
legal and technical standpoints to the ones applicable pursu-
ant to the present license.
Defacto exclusivity clauses, similar to the one set forth above,
eliminate competition from the marketplace for the agreed
upon period and, hence, prices are determined by the only
player in the market. To avoid abuse of either a monopoly or a
quasi-monopoly, project finance agreements containing such ex-
clusivity clauses also provide for a price control or review mecha-
nism. In either case, a regulatory body or a government
agency-in a very rare case, a public/private board-is entrusted
with determining the price of the service or commodity, or at
least reviewing such pricing after it is determined by the project.
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In the latter case, the reviewing body or agency would normally
have veto power over any determined price. This price control
or review mechanism is aimed at counterbalancing/restraining
price fixing by a single or few providers. Whether such mecha-
nism is an effective substitute to market competition and compe-
tition law is doubtful. There is no proof that the reviewed or
controlled price and the quality of the provided service or com-
modity is the same as that which would have been provided in a
free market regulated by competition laws.
Although the interests of the sponsors/creditors do not al-
ways or necessarily coincide with that of the regulatory body, it
may sometimes be in their mutual interests to fix prices at a high
level so long as it is not excessively appalling to cause public dis-
content. This example is especially so where the project finance
agreements provide for payments of royalties or for splitting
charges, or any other similar mechanism, where increased pric-
ing kicks back in one form or the other to the government. It is
not uncommon that a government-run utility will charge high
prices and provide less quality. It is exactly because of this rea-
son that privatization of most public utilities occurred. There-
fore, the mere existence of a regulatory body is no real guaran-
tee of competitive pricing, especially in the absence of actual
competition and/or competition laws. This type of agreement,
providing for exclusivity/price control or review mechanism, is
very close in its model to the more classic monopolistic public
utility model.
The same end, i.e., guaranteeing a certain return or over-
coming market limitations, is better provided for by most fa-
vored treatment clauses. Such clauses provide for non-discrimi-
natory treatment among projects in the same field. A standard
most favored treatment clause is set forth below:
The (government or its successor) shall treat the (project) on
a non-discriminatory basis compared with other projects.
The licensor agrees that the licensee shall enjoy the same
nondiscriminatory treatment as it shall grant companies per-
forming similar activities with a contractual relationship be-
tween either party. The licensor will not grant similar
licenses to any other party with any terms more favorable
than granted to the Company within this license.
Clauses similar to the example above do not eliminate po-
tential competitors but merely guarantee current projects equal
S6720001
S68 FORDHAM1NTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 23:S60
treatment. It is well known that once markets become devel-
oped, operating conditions get better, thus allowing new corners
and edge on older projects. In the absence of a developed com-
petition law, it is necessary for pioneer projects to guard them-
selves against such an eventuality. Contrary to exclusivity
clauses, most favored treatment provisions fill in for a competi-
tion law vacuum. It is a private regulation substituting legislative
powers and, therefore, it is not necessarily contrary to the princi-
ples of free markets and open competition.
This, however, carries with it the risk of tying the govern-
ment's hands and eliminating new entries, which would not get
established in a market unless granted better operating condi-
tions than the existing ones. The market access issue is of major
importance in project finance since the main security for repay-
ment to creditors is the project itself. Its viability, therefore, be-
comes a prime concern. It is in the interest of all creditors and
sponsors to keep such projects operating even if it means elimi-
nating competition or maintaining an uncompetitive project.
To guarantee a continuous cash flow and satisfy creditors, the
project must be kept afloat by all means possible. This goal has
prompted several other contractual arrangements, which collec-
tively may be referred to as creditors provisions aiming at secur-
ing creditors' right of timely repayment, as discussed hereunder.
B. Creditors' Provisions
The creditors' major interest, as stated above, is to preserve
the project's payment capacity. Before examining how this real-
ity reflects itself on project finance agreements and to allow for a
clear understanding of the creditors' interest, it is first necessary
to understand the security package accompanying such projects.
Since project finance is carried out on non-recourse,5 or at least
a limited recourse, basis and the one purpose, the special vehicle
project company, lacks is the credit history necessary for
creditworthiness, it is important for the creditors to obtain collat-
5. Non-resource debt means debt where the creditors may not seek remedies
against the sponsors but only against the project company and its assets, whether tangi-
ble or intangible. See Louis T. Wells & Eric S. Gleason, Is Foreign Infrastructure Investment
Still Risky?, HARV. Bus. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1995, at 44; Stewart E. Rauner, Project Finance: A
Risk Spreading Approach to Commercial Financing of Economic Development, 24 HARV. Ir'L.
L.J. 145 (1983); RoNALD F. Suaa-vAN, FINANCING TRANSNATIONAL PRoJEcrs (1993); SKAD-
DEN, ARes, StATE, MEAGHER & FLom, PROJECT FINANCE (1996).
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eral that would secure the project's debt. This collateral in-
cludes a mortgage on real property, pledge or lien over personal
property of the project (including intangibles), and the assign-
ment of the project's potential revenues. The details of ob-
taining and perfecting security interest in the project company's
assets does not square with the main theme of this Essay.
It must be borne in mind, however, that because of the diffi-
culty or failure to perfect securities under the relevant and appli-
cable laws, the need to provide for alternative protection under
the project finance agreements emerges. An applicable law that
does not allow for a security interest in accounts or other in-
tangibles or one that restricts establishing offshore accounts to
which the project company's revenues may be transferred, will
definitely lead creditors to seek alternative means of controlling
the project. In lieu of, or in addition to, revenue control, credi-
tors normally ensure that sponsors' rights to a continuous cash
flow is secured as well. This statement represents the creditor's
own step in, and substitution rights to secure the project viability
when, and if, needed.
Many of these clauses, if operable within a developed com-
petition legal framework, would be inconsequential insofar as
markets are concerned. Because of the absence of competition
law and lack of actual competition, however, creditors' provi-
sions may disrupt and adversely affect the relevant product mar-
ket, especially with respect to new entries. For instance, the type
of available remedies in cases of default, force majeure, or lenders'
step-in and substitution rights have more than one effect. First,
they influence the availability of the concerned product or ser-
vice in the market, depending on whether the defaulting party is
the only provider. Second, they determine the plausibility of
new project entries to provide the same or substitute services.
Therefore, creditors' provisions examined below are those be-
lieved to be most relevant to competition law, and their effect
thereon is examined in the course of the discussion.
1. Events of Default
The need to maintain the cash flow of the project for pur-
poses of debt repayment necessitates two requisites. First, any
non-payment other than by the project company under the reve-
nue contract will trigger default almost instantaneously. Second,
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non-performance by the project company will not trigger default
until after a relatively long cure period lapses and the lender
banks relinquish their step-in and substitution rights. This dis-
tinction between project events of default and other (or govern-
ment) events of default extend to buyout price, which differs de-
pending on the triggering event of default. These opposing
legal solutions reflect the conflicting interests of the contracting
parties in project finance agreements. While continuous cash
flow and payment capacity is the focal point for creditors and
sponsors, governments are more concerned with the continuity
of public service at reasonable charges and the elimination of
monopolistic risks. These conflicting concerns are better ex-
plained by elaborating on the relevant contractual provisions.
a. Government Events of Default
A standard default provision will protect against all, and
any, risk of dryness of funds. This provision would include not
only cases of non-payment under the revenue contract, but also
instances of dissolution, winding up, voluntary or non-voluntary
bankruptcy, liquidation or appointment of liquidator, lack of
foreign reserves, and adverse change of law affecting the profit-
ability of the transaction. In addition to these fact-specific events
of default, there is a catch-all provision allowing for termination
buyout, which is set forth below:
Any material breach by Government of this Agreement that is
not remedied within (45) days after notice from the Com-
pany identifying the material breach in question in reason-
able detail, and demanding remedy thereof; provided, how-
ever, that for material breaches of this Agreement that can be
cured only in more that (45) days, Government may have
such additional time to cure any material breach under this
Agreement as it estimates may be necessary to cure such ma-
terial breach if, prior to the end of the (45) day period, Gov-
ernment provides satisfactory evidence to the Company that
(i) it has commenced and is diligently pursuing a cure and
(ii) that more than (45) days is required in order to effect
such cure and provides a good-faith estimate of when the ma-
terial breach will be cured.
A catch-all provision like that provided above is meant to
protect the company against any unpleasant risk affecting the
performance of the government. It also allows for the continua-
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tion of the project if such risk does not represent a serious
threat. This clause is meant to create a balance among the com-
peting interests of the parties without allowing either party a
greater leverage.
For this reason, the identical clause appears under com-
pany's event of default. In practice, this provision, while leading
to a potential disagreement as to its exact implementation, none-
theless, serves as an effective pressure tool for either party. The
party whose interest is at risk would require the other party to
provide a remedy or otherwise terminate the agreement if the
latter solution is a better one. The project and its creditors may
use the threat of termination, available under this provision, to
pressure for quick remedies in unsatisfactory situations. From a
competition law perspective, this device may be undesirable, es-
pecially where the project enjoys a dejure or defacto monopoly or
dominant position. In these cases, the project company will
have an extra leverage over the government, which allows it to
tighten its control over the market, especially in absence of com-
petition law.
b. Company Events of Default
Company events of default are usually very specific and lim-
ited to instances where the project company and the banks are
no longer capable or interested in operating the project com-
pany. Rarely is it acceptable to the sponsors or the creditors to
accept the catch-all provision, discussed above, in connection
with government events of default. Here, the conflicting inter-
ests of the contracting parties reflect themselves in the negotia-
tions and find their way to contractual documents. Reproducing
duplicate clauses for both government and company with re-
spect to the catch-all provision requires prudent contractual
drafting and policy.
In reality, including such a mirror clause in the party's
agreement may prove difficult and unacceptable to creditors.
Longer cure periods and step-in and substitution rights are nec-
essary in case of company default. It is beyond acceptable limits
that the banks will suffice themselves with a forty-five day cure
period. Nor will they allow a triggering of termination upon a
basis as wide as the ones stated above. Even with these limita-
tions, a catch-all provision imposed on the company may prove
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useful to the government because it provides for some maneu-
vering powers where a project does not abide by the agreed
upon terms.
The infringing conduct does not have to be an overt breach
of a contractual undertaking. These catch-all provisions are
meant to cover instances that cannot be squared with one of the
events of default. This situation usually occurs when the project
is the only provider of the service or has a dominant position in
the market. In these cases, there is a great temptation to cash in
on such a position even if doing so would violate the agreement
or its spirit. In practice, this violation may take the form of re-
laxing the standards or quality of service in order to gain a finan-
cial advantage. In these cases, the government may use such
provisions to protect the public interest. This case is equally ap-
plicable where competition law policy considerations are at
stake.
Long cure periods and lenders' step-in and substitution
rights are a main characteristic of all company events of default.
Sponsors and their creditors, through such techniques, attempt
to secure their interest in the project for the longest period pos-
sible even where they are in default. Any government right to
terminate will not occur unless and until the lenders decide to
relinquish the project. An example standard step-in rights
clause might read as follows:
From and after the occurrence of the Financial Closing, no
rescission or termination of this Agreement by government
shall be valid or binding upon the lenders without such no-
tice, the expiration of such cure period, and the expiration of
the lenders' cure period, if any, as may be available. The
lenders may make, but shall be under no obligation to make,
any payment or perform any act required to be made or per-
formed by the company, with the same effect as if made or
performed by the company. Upon termination of the cure
period provided to the company and pursuant to written re-
quest from the lenders to government, the lenders shall be
granted a further period of up to 90 days, during which the
lenders shall evaluate the condition of the project and other
matters relevant to the actions to be taken by the lenders to
take possession of the project and cure the event of default.
If prior to then end of such 90 day period, the lenders have
delivered to government a notice that the lenders have
elected to pursue their remedies under the financing agree-
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ments and to attempt diligently to cure the company event of
default, the lenders shall be granted an additional period of
120 days to cure any such company event of default (the
"lenders' cure period"). So long as the lenders diligently at-
tempt to cure such company event of default, government
shall not terminate this agreement in respect of such com-
pany event of default.
The provision above is usually supported by a substitution
clause, under which lenders' step-in rights are confirmed by pro-
viding for the mechanism to be followed for replacing the pro-
ject company by another, if necessary. Such substitution rights
are structured as follows:
during any lenders' cure period.., the lenders shall be enti-
tled, whether by exercise of their rights under the financing
agreement or otherwise, to substitute a company (the "nomi-
nated company") for the company under this Agreement in
accordance with the provisions of the following
paragraphs.... [A] notice (a "substitution notice") may be
given to government by or on behalf of the lenders. The sub-
stitution notice shall indicate the nominated company.
Upon receipt by government of a substitution notice,
government and the relevant lenders shall consult for a pe-
riod of up to 60 days as to the company, which is to be the
nominated company. On or before the expiry of that consul-
tation period, government shall have the right to reject the
company for specific reasons concerning the nominated com-
pany's financial and technical capability to continue the con-
struction and/or operation of the project. Except as afore-
said, government shall not reject a company nominated
under this section.
At the end of the period(s) specified in the above para-
graph: (i) government, the company and the nominated
company shall forthwith execute novations of this Agreement
and the nominated company shall expressly assume in writing
the ongoing rights and obligations of the company under this
Agreement; and (ii) the company shall procure and govern-
ment shall, if necessary, use its good offices to facilitate a
transfer of the company's rights to the site to the nominated
company.
It is clear from the provisions above that standard project
finance practice requires long cure periods and step-in and sub-
stitution rights. Providing for such rights, in most cases, does
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not promote public interest or competition. Long cure periods
simply mean interruption of production or service, which, need-
less to say, is a major concern where a public utility is involved.
Interruption of business means that the public shall not receive
the expected service, which, as previously pointed out, is a politi-
cally undesirable situation.
For these reasons, the government normally would attempt
to prescribe short cure periods, after which the contract is termi-
nated and the government is allowed to run the project. Here,
the stepping stone is creating a balance between the govern-
ment's concern not to cut off a public service, especially if the
project company is the only provider for such service, and the
private party's desire to be allowed sufficient time to remedy and
avoid termination. The agreed compromise reflects not only the
bargaining powers of either party, but also political and eco-
nomic concerns. A vulnerable government is less likely to make
aggressive compromises, as is the private party from investing in
a fragile country.
On the other hand, step-in and substitution rights overtly
contradict the principles of transparency and open competition.
The right of the lenders to replace the existing project company
with another operating company is according to the lenders'
sole discretion. It does not permit an open offer where the cre-
dentials of more than one prospective operator are considered.
In this respect, much reliance is placed upon the lenders' self-
interest to choose the best possible operator. It would be self-
defeating for the lenders not to elect the most efficient and com-
petent operator. This case may very well be true, yet in practice
there are many considerations, other than the public interest,
that may influence such decision. Acknowledging this reality,
governments occasionally succeed in carving out contractual ex-
ceptions to protect the public interest and to guarantee the con-
tinuity of service. It remains true, however, that the clauses set
forth above do not further equal opportunities or fair competi-
tion.
2. Buyout and Transfer
The risk of termination of the project during the term of
the loan is one of the main concerns of the lender. Any such
termination will affect the cash flow of the project and the con-
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comitant ability to pay back the creditors. Ensuing from this
fact, and despite the above detailed cure periods and step-in and
substitution rights, sponsors and creditors insist that no termina-
tion of the project may occur except upon payment of the
buyout price. Such buyout price is paid without set-off or coun-
terclaim and free from all taxes, duties, or any form of levies.
The buyout price itself is determined by a formula, which nor-
mally would provide for a different calculation method depend-
ing on whether the termination of the project occurs before the
terms of the loans expire. The banks and other creditors will
insist that the buyout price is at least equivalent to the outstand-
ing loans. This is the case even if the termination occurs upon a
company event of default. Where termination is triggered be-
cause of a government event of default, the sponsors will nor-
mally require payment for equity.
Calculation of the buyout price does not in any way attempt
to base itself on or take into consideration the market value of
the project. Whether the calculated buyout price is representa-
tive of the real value of the project is actually irrelevant. Pursu-
ant to competition law criteria, this pricing mechanism is neither
reflective of public interest nor is it in accordance with market
standards. In most cases where both sponsors and lenders fail or
opt not to continue with the operation, the matter is pretty seri-
ous and the project is probably not viable. It is rather contrary
to prudent practice to require a government to pay for a worth-
less project.
This case is even more outrageous where it is the company's
actions that give rise to the critical situation. These clauses, simi-
lar to those previously discussed, are mainly concerned with the
financial needs of the sponsors and creditors, and not with the
competition requirements. This rationale is partly justified by
the fact that the only security for the creditors is the project it-
self. They have limited or no recourse other than the project.
Hence, the inclusion of such clauses is imperative, or otherwise
proper finance may prove difficult if not impossible to obtain.
Some of the inadequacies of the creditors' provisions are partly
mitigated by counter provisions imposed by the government to
promote its main and more important interests from a competi-
tion law perspective as discussed hereunder.
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III. GOVERNMENT CONTRACTUAL CLAUSES
A major concern of governments entering into utility re-
lated contracts is the continuity and price of services provided
under such contracts. As pointed out earlier, these matters are
politically sensitive and, in the majority of cases, are strictly regu-
lated. The situation is further complicated if the private opera-
tor of the public utility enjoys a dejure or defacto monopoly.
Even when the private project is the major, although not
the only, provider of the public service, the matter is still a sensi-
tive one. Here, the government is more cautious to accept long
cure periods or high buyout prices. To balance contractual
clauses protecting creditors' interest, the government, during
negotiations, will insist on an allocation of contractual risks,
which does not adversely affect its main interests. Contractual
clauses are executed to guard the government against the risk of
interruption of public service/tariff manipulation. These two
major contractual undertakings are examined separately here-
under.
A. Tariff Control
In the absence of actual competition and lack of competi-
tion law, the risk of price fixing by the only or major provider of
service is a real threat. In monopolistic or quasi-monopolistic
markets the government negotiates project finance deals, in ad-
dition to the previously referenced regulatory boards or pricing
committees, employs a cost-sharing approach or a tariff formula,
or a combination of both. Under a cost-sharing approach, the
government requires the project company to install a cost con-
trol accounting system and to open its books for the inspection
and verification of the government representatives.
Here, the tariff to be charged by the project is determined
on the basis of cost plus. The project company agrees that the
charged tariff would represent its costs plus a certain return.
This situation is normally subject to certain limitations beyond
which extra costs are neglected and not taken into consideration
when calculating the tariff. These limitations are to discourage
projects from inflating their costs or at least acting in reckless
disregard of incurred costs.
Projects normally resist this costs plus approach, which ties
their hands in order to minimize costs for purposes of increasing
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the profit margins. This concern is a real one and represents the
main disadvantage of the cost plus approach. There is no real
motivation for a project to reduce its incurred costs since this
reduction will not be reflected in its profit margin, but will be
reduced from its charged tariff.
To overcome these disadvantages, many of the project fi-
nance agreements allow one form or another of kickback to the
company. Sometimes the company is allowed to retain the cost
savings as an increase in profitability margins, where such savings
do not exceed a certain percentage. In other agreements, any
cost savings are split among the project and the government,
and it is the latter's share that is used to reduce the charged
tariff. There are many techniques of sharing cost savings used to
motivate the project to reduce costs in spite of a cost plus tariff
basis.
To avoid the complications of cost plus calculations, which
need a permanent and elaborated inspection and verification
mechanism, many project finance agreements use a tariff
formula upon which the tariff is calculated at any given time.
The components of the tariff formula are normally laid out in an
annex, which forms part of the party's agreement. Some of
these components are variables, while others are constant in-
puts. It is through such variable inputs that the tariff adjustment
occurs.
Any such adjustment may not be carried out without being
first negotiated and agreed to by the government. Defacto, this
may result in price stabilization if the government does not con-
sent to the suggested tariff adjustment. Accordingly, a govern-
ment is guaranteed that the end consumer will never pay non-
politically correct prices for public services. For the same rea-
sons, and because of monopolistic concerns, the government
would normally request a finance and performance bond or
bonds, which normally take the form of a letter of credit or guar-
antee. Such bonds may adversely affect the tariff negotiated and
agreed upon with the government. Withdrawing the deposited
bond is a real likelihood if the tariff adjustment, introduced to
reflect lenders' requests, is not acceptable to the government.
B. Service Continuity
The efficient and continuous operation of the project is the
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bottom-line necessity for guaranteeing the continuity of public
service. To attain this goal, the government retains to itself a
supervisory role over implementation aspects affecting the provi-
sion of service.
One main relevant area is the operating and maintenance
contract. In most cases, this contract is concluded after the con-
clusion of the main project contracts, i.e., revenue, concession
or sale, etc. In most project agreements, however, the approval
of the future operation and maintenance contractor by the gov-
ernment is a condition precedent for the effectiveness of the
main project contracts. The identity of the operator and man-
ager of the project greatly influences the proper operation of
the project and the continuity and quality of provided services.
This issue is particularly relevant in monopolistic or quasi-
monopolistic markets, where the project company is the only or
main provider of the public service. It is a standard practice in
such cases for the government to have a contractual veto power
over the appointment or change of the project operator and
manager. It is not sufficient that the government sets out the
standards according to which operator or manager is selected.
Here, unlike the case of competitive markets where there is
more than one supplier of the same service, governments insist
that the operation of the project shall not be contracted out un-
less, and until, it has approved the potential operator. Realizing
that the sponsors developing the project may not necessarily pos-
sess the necessary know-how for operation and maintenance,
governments never go as far as totally prohibiting the appoint-
ment of an O&M contractor. In most cases, however, the delega-
tion of this task is contractually regulated.
The degree and extent of such regulation depends on the
market in which the project is located, its structure, and the sig-
nificance of the project production to the whole market produc-
tion. In all cases, governments prefer to place responsibility for
O&M with the project company, regardless of the entity actually
entrusted with such task. A standard clause regulating the O&M
of the project is set forth below:
The company has the right to operate and maintain the
complex, as required to promote its best interests, and shall
operate and maintain the complex in a manner that maxi-
mizes its output and minimizes unnecessary costs provided,
however, that the company may contract with the operation
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and maintenance contractor to operate and maintain the
complex; and provided, further, that the appointment of the
operation and maintenance contractor by the company shall
not relieve the company of any of its obligations or potential
liability regarding the insuring, operation or maintenance of
the complex or any liability whatsoever resulting from a
breach of any term or condition of this agreement.
In addition to the placement of liability with the original
contracting party, i.e.; the project company, there is an operat-
ing committee comprised of representatives of either con-
tracting party overlooking the operation of the project and en-
suring that it is properly executed. The government may ensure,
through an operating committee, that the project is not abusing
its market position and is not engaging in restrictive practices,
e.g., price fixing, which adversely affect the market. The role of
the operating committee is both crucial and sensitive in markets
where there is no competition law or where such law is not suffi-
ciently developed to provide effective conduct standards.
Another related aspect, which directly secures the proper
operation, continuity, and quality of provided service is the gov-
ernment right of entry. Pursuant to such right, the government
is guaranteed the option to operate the project itself where it
decides that such course of action is necessary. The purpose of
this clause is to allow the government at any time, if necessary, to
step in and take over the operation of the public utility. This
right is not an absolute one but is qualified by several conditions,
the nature of which varies from one transaction to the other. A
standard clause would read as follows:
If, after the commercial operations date, without the prior
written consent of the government the company shall have
abandoned or refused to operate the project, then the gov-
ernment shall (i) be entitled but not obligated to operate it
until the company demonstrates to the reasonable satisfac-
tion of the government that it can and will resume normal
operation, and (ii) as soon as is practicable, send written no-
tice of such action to the lenders in accordance with the pro-
cedure set forth in this agreement; provided that, in the case
of abandonment by the company, the government right to
operate the project hereunder shall be subject to any first of
lenders to operate the project pursuant to the financing
agreements.
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Unless abandonment is defined in another contractual
clause in reference to a specific duration, the government right
of entry clause determines it. How long or short the period de-
pends on how badly the service provided by the public utility is
needed. The abandonment period is usually defined in terms of
hours where a project enjoys a monopoly or a quasi-monopoly
and provides an essential public service, e.g., gas, electricity,
water, etc.
In other cases, especially where there are more than one
provider of the same service, a few days are allowed before the
government may seize and operate the project. It must be noted
that the government rights in this respect are subordinate to that
of the lenders. Thus, if the company abandons the project but
any of the lenders step in and-either personally or via a substi-
tution-operate it, then the government may not use its right of
entry. This case means that the government right of entry is that
of last resort, designated to avoid interruption of production.
The clause set forth above is generally worded, allowing for
entry and operation of the project under any circumstances,
even where the government itself is at default. For instance,
should the government fail to pay its monthly invoices and in
retaliation the project suspends production, the government
may still enter and operate the project. This exact scenario had
actually happened in respect to electrical utility in the Carib-
bean.
A powerful multinational electricity-generating project sus-
pended production as a mean of twisting the government's arm
and obliging it to pay its bills. Unfortunately, the applicable
power purchase agreement had no similar provision as the one
set forth above. Therefore, the government, faced with a cut of
the electrical power in the concerned country, must enter the
power station using armed force and operate it. This case is a
very unfortunate situation, which must be avoided, and there-
fore, carefully drafted project finance agreements would grant
the government the right of entry and operation for purposes of
protecting the public interest. It is not to say that such rights
must be absolute. In fact, the sponsors and lenders, if they can,
insist on carves-out for specific events, e.g., force majeure or
change of law.
Once the government enters and operates the project, it
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does so at its own risk and expense. An example contractual
clause granting a government such right of entry would state in
addition the following:
During any period that the government shall operate the
complex pursuant to this agreement, the government shall
bear all costs of such operation, and shall be relieved from
making payments to the company under this agreement, pro-
vided, that to avoid foreclosure under the financing agree-
ments during operation by government, government shall
continue to pay to the company the debt service portion of
the capacity payment as the company would otherwise be en-
tifled to during such period, less actual damages (other than
operation and maintenance expenses) incurred by govern-
ment.
Notwithstanding any other provision in this Agreement
to the contrary, government shall operate the project in ac-
cordance with the operating limits, prudent utility practices
and the applicable laws and shall indemnify and hold the
company harmless from any loss or damage to the project in-
curred, suffered or sustained by the company by reason of
government's negligence or willful misconduct in the opera-
tion of the project during such period, but only to the extent
that such loss or damage is not covered by insurance.
The provision above represents a middle-ground solution
for the thorny problem of payment for production or service
during the government operation period. A project company
not operating the public utility and, hence, not providing the
public service, may not claim payment for works not done. In
practice, however, the world is not that simple. Lenders have a
right of foreclosure. In addition, a provision must be entered to
reflect the fact that the failure of the company to operate the
project properly may not be always due to its own mismanage-
ment or default. If such a contingency is not provided, then it
must be reflected in the payment arrangements.
The conditions and circumstances under which a company
gets paid even if not operating the project usually present a very
difficult negotiating point. Because the government right of en-
try is subordinated to that of the lenders, the latter may agree to
excuse, in cases of default, the debt service payment. In such
circumstances, however, the government right of entry clause is
tied to the buyout provision. Once the government starts run-
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ning the project, it shoulders all responsibility in respect of such
operation, which must be carried out according to the contractu-
ally agreed upon standards. It is clear from the above examina-
tion that although the main goal of government entry rights is to
ensure the continuity of a public service, private considerations
and interests interfere to limit the full realization of such goal.
An issue relevant to the continuity of service and allocation
of business interruption risk, especially in absence of competi-
tion law, is the duty to restore a damaged project. Who should
shoulder such a duty? Pursuant to the general principles of
property law, the owner of the plant bears the risk of injury and,
hence, the duty, or-more accurately-the option, to restore it.
It is an option, not a duty because the general principles of law
do not oblige an owner to restore his/her damaged property un-
less he/she voluntarily does so. Therefore, the simple answer to
the above question is to identify the owner of the project with
whom the option to restore lies.
In the world of project finance, matters are not that simple,
and the damaged project may affect parties other than the
owner. Many interests are at stake here. Putting aside the in-
quiry into the ownership of the project, there are the creditors
and the government who may not own the project, but who may
be directly injured as a result of the loss of the project. The
creditors will lose their revenue-generating source from which
they are to be repaid. This loss leaves them with no option, and
even the right of foreclosure is emptied from all its content in
such circumstances, since there is nothing on which to foreclose.
The government might not be the owner of the project, but yet
it has much to lose from the discontinuity of the service. Not
only is the matter politically undesirable, but it is also socially
unacceptable.
In fact, in such situations the government is the biggest
loser, especially where the project is the only or major provider
of a given public service. In a competitive market, where more
than one provider competes and provides the same service, the
withdrawal of any one project-for whatever reason-does not
need to adversely affect the market as a whole. Even if it does,
the existence of a well-developed legal structure for competition
would facilitate new entries, substituting for the old ones or pro-
viding alternative services.
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In the absence of such legal regulation and actual competi-
tion, the government's interests are severely undermined, if not
totally lost, as a result of the discontinuity of service because of
the damage to the project. It is because of these reasons that
most project finance agreements attribute great significance to
the restoration issue. No longer do the parties regard it as an
owner's option. It adversely affects all interests at stake, be it
those of the creditors or the government. Therefore, the answer
to the question of who shoulders the burden of restoration is
dependent on who caused the damage or injury.
According to general principles of contract law, damage en-
suing from either contracting party's breach or default, or the
breach or default of those for whom they are responsible, is to
be restored by the breaching or defaulting party causing the
damage. The issue becomes complicated in respect to a damage
or loss that does not ensue from either party's action or inaction.
This contingency arises in respect of force majeure events and is
the one more commonly addressed and provided for in project
finance agreements.
As was pointed out, the solutions provided by the applica-
tion of the general principles of contract law are not satisfactory
in this context. Rarely would a project finance agreement give
the project's owner an absolute discretion whether to restore.
This matter is not subject to the sole discretion of the owner, but
is contractually regulated in great detail. The content of such
regulation depends on the negotiation powers of either con-
tracting party and the vested interests at stake.
A standard restoration clause would prescribe the following
minimal requirements:
(a) In the event that the project or any part thereof is dam-
aged as a result of any force majeure event, the company
shall within thirty days thereafter, prepare and deliver a
restoration report to the government.
(b) Within fifteen business days of the delivery of a restora-
tion report to the government or such further time as
the parties may agree, the parties shall meet to discuss
the restoration report and any action (s) to be taken. In
connection with the review by the government of a res-
toration report, the company shall provide promptly to
the government such additional financial and related
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information pertaining to the restoration report and
the matters described therein as the government may
reasonably request.
(c) If the estimated costs of restoration, as indicated in the
restoration report as agreed to by the parties, are (i)
recoverable (subject to applicable deductibles) from in-
surance required to be carried by the company in ac-
cordance with this agreement, or (ii) less than a certain
percentage of the engineering, procurement, and con-
struction contract price, then, subject to the rights of
lenders under the financing agreements, the company
shall effect the restoration as soon as practicable.
If it is not possible to proceed with restoration, then either
party may terminate this agreement according to its own terms
setting forth the date for transfer of the project, in accordance
with the transfer annex, whereupon, subject to the provisions of
this annex, this agreement shall terminate on the transfer date.
The threshold for restoration may not always be a percentage of
the engineering, procurement, and construction contract. Many
other formulas can be adopted, depending on the parties in-
volved and the type of the project. The more important issue is
that there is always a dividing line beyond which the project has
no option but to restore. This division should be reasonable
enough to allow the project to suspend its operation if restora-
tion is too costly, impracticable, or unfeasible. Because of the
previously detailed public concerns, however, projects should
not be let off the hook easily. The public interest here is far
more important than any financial burden, especially if a substi-
tute or alternative provider is not readily available because of a
particular market structure.
Here, contract provisions attempt to substitute market regu-
lation and competition law. If these two considerations are well
developed in any relevant market, then the need for detailed
restoration clauses of the sort set forth above is less pressing.
Projects operating in such markets are rarely monopolistic and
new entries are always available.
CONCLUSION
It is clear from the above analysis that, because of the lack of
competition regulation, certain contract provisions attempt to
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substitute for such vacuum. In an era when private ownership of
infrastructure projects is gaining grounds, the need for elabo-
rated competition regulation is more pressing than ever. Private
ownership does not necessarily mean personal funding. The
more common mode of funding involves a syndicate of banks,
which brings a third competing interest to this type of transac-
tions, rendering the need for competition law an essentiality to
avoid confusion. The involved interests, while diversified, are
not always conflicting. For instance, the continuity of public ser-
vice is a major concern of all contracting parties, but for differ-
ent reasons. This unity of goals justifies a unity of solutions in
form of uniform legal reforms.
